HCAA SIAN 04-2024 - GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM OUTAGE AND ALTERATIONS LEADING TO COMMUNICATION / NAVIGATION / SURVEILLANCE DEGRADATION

Is addressed to:

•              Operators of Commercial Air transport (CAT Fixed Wing and Rotorcraft)

•              Air Navigation Service Provider – ATCOs

Briefing:

Recipients must ensure that this notice is communicated to all members of their staff who need to take appropriate action or who may be interested in the contents of the notice.

INTRODUCTION

This SIAN is issued following EASA SIB 2022-02R3 dated 5 July 2024 which is attached.

Since February 2022, there has been an increase in jamming and/or spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). EASA has analysed recent data from the Network of Analysts and open sources and has concluded that GNSS jamming and/or spoofing has shown further increase in the severity of its impact, as well as the overall growth of intensity and sophistication of these events.

This issue particularly affects the geographical areas surrounding conflict zones, but it is also encountered in the south and eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, Baltic Sea, and Arctic area.

The list of affected flight information (FIR) regions is published on the EASA website at https://www.easa.europa.eu/GNSS.

Jamming is intentional radio frequency interference (RFI) with GNSS signals. This interference prevents receivers from locking onto satellite signals and has the main effect of rendering the GNSS system ineffective or degraded for users in the jammed area.

Spoofing involves broadcasting counterfeit satellite signals to deceive GNSS receivers, causing them to compute incorrect position, navigation, and timing (PNT – Positioning Navigation Timing) data.

On page 2 of EASA SIB, relevant examples of issues that the degradation of GNSS signals could generate are presented.

Generally, repeated or widespread disruptions of the GNSS signals can lead to an increased workload of both flight crews and air traffic controllers which can cause cognitive overload or confusion and increase the risk for errors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To address the identified issues EASA recommends the implementation of relevant mitigating measures. These measures are to be considered for the flight information regions published on EASA website and should be extended to any other area where GNSS jamming and/or spoofing is identified. Some recommendations for aircraft operators are separated for jamming as compared with spoofing, due to the specificities of the two different cases.

The recommendations that are proposed by EASA for Air Navigation Service Providers and Air Operators are included in an EXCEL file which is to be filled and returned to HCAA via [email protected], by the 10th of September 2024.

All parties concerned are reminded of their obligations to report any event impacting safety according to Regulation (EU) No. 376/2014.

Air operators are also reminded to report the suspected GNSS spoofing and higher-risk jamming occurrences to aircraft manufacturers and support their investigations by providing relevant information in compliance with point ORO.GEN.160 (b) of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

Thank you all for working on improving flight safety.

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